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   The paper discusses the numerous sources of the difficulties encountered in the functioning of 
Poland's eastern border and analysis their diverse nature. It has been pointed out that they are generated 
to a large extent by geopolitical factors, which hold the key to their successful solution. The paper 
concerns in a role of mentality and demons of the past in shaping geopolitical premises. 
Due to the absence of sufficiently developed endogenous factors in the region, the early years 
of the process of transformations proved that the incentives for growth can come from the asymmetry 
of economic potentials that exists between the regions of Poland and the border regions of the former 
Soviet republics. In this way, thanks to exogenous factors, the potentials on both sides of the border 
get balanced, a phenomenon known from earlier studies. It can be expected that in the future the 
region will generate its own growth factors through complementary cooperation. 
From the point of view of the functioning of the future external border of the EU, the paper 
deals with two problems. The first deals with the shortfalls in transport infrastructure and the widely 
known problems with the functioning of trans-European transport corridors, where the border crossings 
remain the crucial spots. The second problem concerns the operation of the private sector or indeed of 
the presence of an environment for private enterprise, which is also taken up in the context of 
geopolitical factors, due to the impact it can have on the introduction of constructive changes leading to 
the establishment of durable goodneighbourly relations. History shows that this can be a highly 
effective tool for uprooting old prejudice as it permits the relatively fast emergence of new economic 
ties stemming from shared interests and it is generally conducive to openness. This view was borne out 
by empirical studies into the functioning of Poland's eastern border. Only if the conditions for the 
development of local and regional enterpreneurship in border regions are guaranteed, can the European 
challenges to the functioning of the eastern border bear fruit. STUDIES ON THE FACTORS SHAPING THE POLISH AND BELARUS 
TRANSBORDER COOPERATION 
Maria Ciechocinska, University of Podlasie, Zytnia 19/21, 08-110 Siedlce, Poland, Fax (48 
25) 644-2045, E-mail janowsk@imp.edu.pl 
1. Introduction 
  Many institutions conducting studies into the changes taking place in contemporary 
world and publishing their own charts of countries in the process of transition gave Poland 
high marks, especially for the early phase of the socio-economic reforms. Poland is also seen 
as a favourable place for foreign direct investment. According to the FDI Confidence Index 
calculated by A.T. Kearney, in January 2000 Poland placed fifth (compared to the 8
th place in 
June 1999) among 60 countries embraced by the ranking, which between themselves account 
for over 60% of FDI. The index is calculated on the basis of the opinions of the bosses and 
managerial staff employed in one thousand biggest companies in the world, which finance 
about 70% of such investment. Poland is sometimes actually seen as the tiger of Central 
Europe and it may soon be forced to pay more for World Bank loans by footing the bill for part 
of the administrative expenses involved in preparing them. Poland is regarded as a stable 
country that has successfully moved to market economy. The Polish people are waiting for the 
successful completion of the negotiations leading to accession to the EU, as a result of which 
the border between Eastern and Western Europe will move from the Oder and Neisse to rivers 
little known in the West, namely the Bug and the Uzh. 
  These facts and opinions are a yardstick of Poland's accomplishments of the 1990s; at 
the same time, however, they visualise the indispensable sequence of further changes 
generated by European integration and the ongoing modifications in geopolitical alignments on 
the global scale. In this paper, I will analyse these generally known processes using the 
example of a case study of the Southern Podlasie region. The paper refers to the fast pace of 
change in the development of entrepreneurship in the border region, which underwent dramatic 
changes. Within a relatively short period of time, in a space of just one decade, huge numbers 
of new private firms were registered, only to experience a brief era of prosperity before 
suspending trading and next going into liquidation. Then their place was taken by new firms 
specialising in a different branch of economic activity or operating on a different market than 
the firms that have just been wound up. At first the region in question received the growth 
impulses from endogenous factors generated by the socio-economic reforms. By setting in train the transition to a new system, the political and economic liberalisation started three kinds 
of processes: 
i/ the dynamic growth of entrepreneurship, 
ii/ the development of the private sector, 
iii/ the establishment of a local and regional environment conducive to the development of 
entrepreneurship, the establishment of democratic institutions and a new social order. 
  In 1989, it appeared that due to its peripheral location, Southern Podlasie, a region in 
which traditional fragmented farming predominate and in which there are no major urban 
centres, would benefit only to a limited extent from market economy in the future, considering 
the dearth of capital, knowledge, institutions and especially infrastructure. Only a year later, 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar global system led to the 
activation of exogenous factors by unexpectedly opening up new markets and new 
development opportunities for nascent entrepreneurship. In these circumstances, with the 
situation as exceptional as this, local authorities did not guess the scenario of necessary action 
because they lacked both the experience and foresight. They did not resort to collective 
thinking about the ways of exploiting in a rational way the opening up of the state border and 
its demilitarisation due to geopolitical changes. At this exceptional moment, the low level of 
the region's development and the evident civilisational gap did not appear to present a 
significant obstacle to the maintaining the region's unexpected prosperity. 
  The signs of the enterprise spirit could be seen with the naked eye. It infected the 
indigenous inhabitants of the region. The situation was so exceptional that almost immediately 
the area saw the arrival of people from other parts of Poland who provided the substratum for 
the development of the private sector, as well as various shady characters, some of them from 
the former USSR. It ought to be stressed that unprofessional actions predominated in this 
climate of general economic recovery, relying on very simple if not altogether crude solutions. 
Nonetheless the first years of the transformations, i.e., the years 1990-1993, provided evidence 
of the immense potential of market economy, free from administrative restrictions. The 
spontaneous economic activity determined the scope of the region's restructuring. Bazaars 
began to flourish, everybody wanted to trade in something, even farm buildings built for an 
altogether different purpose but conveniently located, e.g. by a major road, were converted into 
warehouses or factories churning out goods which were in demand among the visitors from 
across the border. Trading became the common occupation of the population, which used to rely on agriculture as their means of subsistence until recently. Thanks to geopolitical changes, 
radical changes got under way in the region in question. Starting with 1993, domestic 
entrepreneurs were joined on an ever bigger scale by the first foreign investors, who opened up 
their branches, established cooperation and invested in local staff. At the same time, the first 
business associations were set up, such as the local chamber of commerce. The Cooperation 
Forum for the Region's Development was established in May of that year and one of its first 
actions was to order a study of the region with German firms based in Berlin. Already in 1994, 
thanks to half a year of work of experts from Ubw Unternehmensberatung GmbH and 




the strategic location of Southern Podlasie in the trans-European transport corridor, attempts 
were made to secure funding for this undertaking from EU funds. This means that right at the 
start of the transformations, the area found itself to be in a much better situation than other 
regions of Poland. 
2. Southern Podlasie Region 
  The functioning of Poland's eastern state border in the years 1989-2000 and the region 
concerned as such is the subject of studies conducted by the Chair of Regional Studies of the 
University of Podlasie in Siedlce. The emphasis on geopolitical factors in this text calls for as 
brief outline of the main strategic features of the region. This region bisects symmetrically the 
European transport corridor, linking London-Paris-Berlin-Warsaw-Minsk-Moscow and further 
on to the Far East across Siberia. It is therefore a segment of a transcontinental transport 
corridor linking Western Europe-Germany-Belarus-Russia. It has also been referred to as a 
development axis of supraregional significance because it links the Baltic coast with Ukraine, 
Slovakia and Hungary and on to the Mediterranean shores. It is the crossing point of important 
road, rail and water routes, whose appeal depends in a large way on geopolitical determinants. 
For geopolitical considerations, the waterways of this part of Europe lost their economic 
significance in the 20
th century. On the other hand, thanks to the failure to build the planned 
hydrological and navigational structures, they have become a newly discovered tourist and 
ecological attraction owing to the biodiversity preserved there. 
  The region is reaping medium- and long-term profits from its transit role in the 
aforementioned corridor. In general, depending on changes in the geopolitical situation and 
political relations between the above mentioned states, fluctuations occur in the intensity of 
transit traffic and of economic activity, sometimes quite pronounced ones. The occasional political tensions or ill-advised administrative restrictions are reflected in shifts in the use of 
the transport infrastructure network, with some routes and directions becoming nearly desolate 
for a period of time while other routes experience a boom in passenger and freight traffic. This 
is a consequence of the fact that in this part of Europe, along Poland's eastern state border, 
there are four countries which only appeared or reappeared on the map of Europe as a result of 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It should be remembered that in the previous period, all 
the way up to 1990, this was a huge monolith governed by one ideology and one philosophy, 
ruled in a centralised fashion from Moscow headquarters. It embraced Eurasia from the Elbe in 
Germany to the Pacific shores. The appearance of new states, which proclaimed their 
sovereignty and independence one after another, was tantamount to the heralding of and 
consenting to the development of market economy. In practice, this translated into the 
necessity of abandoning the command-and-quota system. The moving power of the free 
market made possible the emergence of a climate conducive to the formation of political elites 
and the ruling class. In the first free elections, the people of those countries voted for the shape 
of the future parliaments and consequently also the future constitution. There is good reason 
for recalling at this point these rudimentary principles of any statehood. 
3. The role of mentality and demons of the past in shaping geopolitical premises 
  The state of business in Southern Podlasie and indirectly also the state of transition 
depends in a great measure on geopolitical factors. Due to the absence of sufficiently 
developed endogenous factors in the region, the early years of the process of transformations 
proved that the incentives for growth can come from the asymmetry of economic potentials 
that exists between the regions of Poland and the border regions of the former Soviet republics. 
In this way, thanks to exogenous factors, the potentials on both sides of the border get 
balanced, a phenomenon known from earlier studies. It can be expected that in the future the 
region will generate its own growth factors through complementary cooperation. These are 
generally known regularities but they only apply to a limited extent to Podlasie, located as it is 
near the border of three new states, namely Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, plus Russia's 
Kaliningrad District. Although the European strategic transport corridor connects the region in 
question only to Belarus, the 1990s showed that maintaining contacts with that country 
encounters obstacles; in such circumstances, alternative routes come to life, like by-passes. 
Then it turns out that the lack of convenient transport connections is not such a great obstacle 
after all.   The spontaneous development of trade in the early stage of the transformations made is 
possible to eliminate old stereotypes and prejudices. Many of them were a product of past 
actions of the authorities, which deliberately fanned them up and nurtured them, so to say, in 
the minds of people kept in isolation, denied their passports and the freedom of travel. The 
borders were subordinated to military goals. The totalitarian propaganda kept terrorising the 
people with an unknown external enemy, cautioned against risk, whipped up a psychosis of 
general danger, while the insubordinate citizens faced exemplary punishment. On the Polish 
side of the border the local population cherished convictions of alleged superiority while on 
the Belarusian side there were displays of either hostility or alienation or at best curiosity or 
jealousy. Meanwhile, in the language of daily propaganda, all the nations of the socialist 
community were united by fraternal friendship, backed by assistance provided by the Soviet 
Union. In this way the myths and lack of truthful knowledge of the past, coupled to 
administrative manipulation, shaped the personalities of people living in those areas. 
Ironically, when the state borders were opened it turned out that people living on both sides of 
them could easily communicate with one another, they often spoke the same language or 
sufficiently similar languages to understand each other. This was accompanied by genuine 
friendliness, often bordering on cordiality. The young generation suddenly discovered the 
cultural and mental affinity with their peers across the border, while for the older generation, 
this was a particularly forceful emotional experience, especially when they discovered their 
relatives from nearby places from whom they were separated by the border for fifty years. 
Such instances concerned first of all Polish families residing in what is now Belarusian 
territory, especially those with low level of education, because under the old system those 
people either were unable to surmount the bureaucratic obstacles to such contacts or 
consciously gave them up out of the fear of losing a good job, social status, etc. In Poland, the 
society won a broader scope of personal freedoms and was less docile toward the authorities. 
The crisis of the political and economic system in Poland became earlier and the authorities 
permitted the development of private enterprise, albeit on a small scale, of their own accord. 
One effect of the political liberalisation was foreign travel, especially popular among the 
inhabitants of the areas situated along the eastern border, who went in droves to the US, 
ostensibly as tourists or to visit relatives, but in reality to work in the parallel economy. 
  The system transformation capitalised in a great measure on the wealth of knowledge 
about market economy and its institutions, accumulated in this inconspicuous way. At the 
same time, former emigrants, capable of assessing in a professional way the new business opportunities, started coming back to the old country. Meanwhile, both in Poland and in the 
former Soviet republics, people who used to be stuck to their necks in the state sector of 
economy, often exploited the enterprises run by them for doing business in their own name. In 
this way former communist officials set up their own firms. This was one of the mechanisms 
which lay at the foundation of the new social order and its institutions. With some 
oversimplification, it could be said that in the former Soviet republics the process of 
emergence of the entrepreneurial class was largely hijacked by the people of the former 
regime. This was facilitated by the lack of general mobilisation to exploit the emerging 
economic opportunities as the society appeared to be lost and waited passively for what was 
going to happen next. It soon turned out that the possibilities of jumping onto the bandwagon 
of change got severely restricted, especially in Belarus, where economic freedoms were almost 
completely eliminated and replaced by administrative regulations. In this way, the benefits of 
transition were largely limited to the select few in the name of its alleged protection from 
deformities and the social ills associated with the free market. Such conclusions are warranted 
by comparative analyses made by the Regional Studies Chair of the University of Podlasie in 
neighbouring regions situated on both sides of the border. 
  If in Poland the example of the eastern border in the early years of transition provided 
evidence of the widespread will to engage in the building of the democratic system and return 
to Polish statehood, in the East the situation was more complicated, despite initial similarities. 
There can only be talk of a full correspondence in the case of Lithuania, if we ignore the 
dramatic episode involving the civilian defence of a local television station from units of 
OMON, the Russian special service and the attempts to impose an embargo on oil shipments 
and on trade with Lithuania. As for Belarus, and some time later also Ukraine, formally 
declared the will to go ahead with transformations. However, the problems with building an 
independent state, caused by the lack of consensus, resulted in the protracted discussions over 
the applicability of Western models of parliamentary democracy and of expanding relations 
with the West. At the same time, the ruling class displayed a lack of consistency in 
implementing the reforms. This is why the conservative, pro-Russian line prevailed in Belarus, 
while Ukraine keeps launching renewed efforts to lay the foundations of independent 
statehood. 
  Such generalisations bring to mind processes known from the studies of the 
disintegration of empires and the process of former colonies becoming independent. Plenty of 
illusions and frustrations are born in such circumstances and it is worth examining them in the context of the functioning of the future external border of the EU. These are really weighty 
problems and they should receive due consideration in the scenarios of future developments, 
also those from more distant future. It has been known that due to the constant shifts in their 
state procedures and the constant search for new arrangements, the internal situation of those 
countries is far removed from the expectations of the international community, which is 
interested in the establishment of stable order. The negative aspects of the internal situation are 
even reflected in the practices employed at the border, e.g. when the state lags behind with 
wage payments to customs officers or border guards. Internal political disputes, in turn, 
translated into endless changes of procedures, legislative and institutional changes, etc. As a 
result, the high risk involved in economic activities, combined with not very transparent rules 
of the game and the never-ending search for scapegoats to blame for the failures, slowed down 
the development of market economy. In such circumstances, the old demons of prejudice, 
mistrust and envy come back to life and thrive. In a climate of overall impotence, only the 
multiplying restrictions and bans remain legible. This bears out the old truth that successfully 
developing commercial and economic relations can do the most to eliminate old traumas and 
push them into oblivion. The lack of universally accepted regulations is conducive to the 
development of trans-border organised crime, which flourishes, damaging goodneighbourly 
relations in the process. The limiting of the privilege of profiting from international contacts to 
selected groups operating on the border of law leaves open the question how in these 
circumstances the EU is going to civilise its new external boundary and how it is going to 
arrange its relations with other countries, including ones that do not have a direct border with 
it. 
4. European Challenges Regarding the Functioning of the Eastern Border 
  There are numerous sources of the difficulties encountered in the functioning of 
Poland's eastern border and they are of diverse nature. It has also been suggested that they are 
generated to a large extent by geopolitical factors, which hold the key to their successful 
solution. From the point of view of the functioning of the future external border of the EU, I 
will just point out two problems in this paper. The first deals with the shortfalls in transport 
infrastructure and the widely known problems with the functioning of trans-European transport 
corridors, where the border crossings remain the crucial spots, where one can see the scale of 
the unresolved problems and the clash of two worlds and two philosophies. One of them was 
developed by the affluent EU countries, having a single market at their disposal. The other is 
shared by the former East bloc countries, for many of which, similarly as for Russia, the lack of political decisions halted the socio-economic transition, economic liberalisation and the 
introduction of democratic institutions. In these circumstances, the nostalgia for the Soviet 
Union surfaces and the faith in the possibilities of its revival. What is more, actions designed 
to block liberalisation and democratisation are seen there as a virtue, never mind the fact that 
they lead to dangerous isolation. The next step can be periodic displays of hostility toward 
foreigners at the border, depending on swings in the political situation. Such attitudes can seem 
out of time but when they stem out of ideological premises, this really does not augur well for 
the future. 
  It is true that the infrastructure of border crossings along the eastern border has 
improved immensely during the last decade, that their number has increased and passport and 
customs clearance procedures have been simplified but they still leave a lot to be desired. This 
serves as the basis for formulating a thesis about the superiority of global-scale politics, where 
the tensions appearing at the top level can even be felt in the operation of border crossings. 
Furthermore, an observer will likely be struck by the ease with which the petrified models of 
behaviour, characteristic of the cold-war period and the time when the confrontation doctrine 
reigned supreme, can spring back to life for a while and are evident in the mode of 
organisation of work at border crossing points. Their monitoring proves the huge role of 
geopolitical factors, which not even the best technical or organisational arrangements can 
eliminate. Proven procedures can radically change the operation of border areas and the border 
as such but they need not be tantamount to finding a solution satisfactory to the parties 
concerned. 
  The second problem concerns the operation of the private sector or indeed of the 
presence of an environment for private enterprise, which is also taken up in the context of 
geopolitical factors, due to the impact it can have on the introduction of constructive changes 
leading to the establishment of durable goodneighbourly relations. History shows that this can 
be a highly effective tool for uprooting old prejudice as it permits the relatively fast emergence 
of new economic ties stemming from shared interests and it is generally conducive to 
openness. This view was borne out by empirical studies into the functioning of Poland's 
eastern border. Only if the conditions for the development of local and regional 
enterpreneurship in border regions are guaranteed, can the European challenges to the 
functioning of the eastern border bear fruit. 
  In this context it is assumed that the setting in train of the process of economic growth 
based on healthy foundations and aided by structural funds will constitute an important factor in the restructuring. The fall of the Iron Curtain produced tangible economic and political 
benefits for all of Europe in the 1990s but the new decade calls for new endeavours. 
  There are the beleaguered fort syndromes, following from large gaps in living standards 
between the EU and other countries. It is optimistic that arrivals from other continents 
predominate among prospective illegal immigrants. Similarly as most CEE nations, Poles are 
not interested in mass emigration. Generally, then, the situation is under control as required by 
international conventions. Nonetheless, the functioning of the future external border of the EU 
is the subject of discussions and a search for solutions that would preclude a reconstruction of 
a divisive border known so well from the cold war period. It is feared that an analysis 
restricted to economic indicators may turn out to be lame and lead to the selection of not the 
best arrangements. Practice has shown that the cultural and mental context is very important 
for capitalising on customs or indeed the systems of values observed in a given region. 
  In each of the three new countries formed outside Poland's eastern border the process of 
emergence of the new structures, despite many common features inherited from the Soviet 
system, produced a different outcome in the 1990s. The states that used to fall into the Soviet 
zone of influence until quite recently and which Moscow in its diplomatic parlance divided 
into near and distant abroad, display a diversified degree of interest in the continuation of the 
old ties. Former membership of the Comecon creates peculiar problems with economic 
restructuring at a time of advancing globalisation. The arbitrarily imposed Soviet standards, 
organisational structures and institutions guaranteed the dominant position of the central 
authorities. But as the former Soviet Republics move to market economy, they search for 
relations based on partnership and for access to markets. It seems that we are witnessing a 
division into the countries that have reoriented to the West and those which seek to rebuild old 
bonds and continue to face east. In reality, however, the problem is more complicated than 
that. A declaration about the choice of one or the other option does not in itself determine the 
success of transformations. Besides, it is evident by now that the choice of the pro-Eastern 
orientation is not tantamount to ;the blocking of Westernisation. The aforementioned Belarus 
is trying hard to build ever closer relations with Russia but in that way it exposes itself to 
elements of the Western culture already present there and becomes Westernised itself, like 
most other post-Soviet countries. This is best seen in pop music, fashions, etc.  Nevertheless, 
political and economic liberalisation is perceived in Belarus as a threat to the status quo. Only 
the president is empowered to disburse to the people the profits from the opening up of the 
economy as he sees fit. This is the reason for numerous financial and administrative curbs, restricting and destroying private enterprise. Belarus is a textbook example of a country that 
froze its market-oriented reforms at a very early stage, which only embraced the so-called 
small privatisation. The international community knows Belarus as a country that curtails civil 
liberties. Occasionally, when it comes to gross violations, it is mitigated by Russia, which 
insists on the observance of generally binding norms. 
  In these circumstances, most of Polish-Belarusian trans-border cooperation projects 
stand only a very limited chance of being implemented. As the economic situation in Belarus 
deteriorates and the society is getting poorer, more and more people try their hand at 
smuggling or simply turn to crime. Any attempt to seal the border is reflected in a dramatic 
drop in the volume of trading at bazaars along the border. This starts a chain reaction, 
including a fall in production in local enterprises in Poland. Small merchants and craftsmen 
start mailing protest letters to the authorities, complaining about the threat of unemployment as 
there are no alternative means of subsistence. On the other hand, the Belarusian president 
keeps proclaiming closer relations with Russia, although apart from military decisions, there 
have been no other regulations, e.g. concerning fiscal or financial policy. One way or another, 
the early 1990s are regarded in areas along the Polish eastern border as a time of exceptional 
prosperity, which already belongs to the past. 
  This might formally be regarded as typical difficulties that occur when European 
standards have to be translated into CEE realities. This is most often interpreted as a symptom 
of a clash of different procedures, different customs systems, ways of operation of border 
guards, etc. In other words, the emphasis is on eliminating the existing technical and 
organisational differences; however, such uniformisation takes time and requires some 
investment. However, it is necessary to unifomise the procedures or find satisfactory solutions 
for purely practical reasons. For example, when the use of the transit corridor via Belarus 
becomes too much of a nuisance, forwarders choose longer routes to Moscow, running through 
Ukraine, Lithuania or Slovakia. Then things improve for a while. It should be emphasised that 
both the condition of the road infrastructure and traffic conditions are difficult, the narrow 
roads are crowded and dangerous. Even minor organisational changes can cause disruption 
painfully experienced by all road users. For example, on Good Friday, on April 21, 2000, 
Germany banned trucks from its roads for four days. After Easter, despite the efforts of Polish 
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officers, over 2,000 trucks were caught in that traffic jam then. 
  The growing difficulties in economic cooperation with Belarus were the reason why 
entrepreneurs from Southern Podlasie turned their eyes to Lithuania and Ukraine. Lithuania 
gets high marks from international observers for the advancement of its market-oriented 
reforms. Both the Polish and the Lithuanian government are working hard to make sure that 
cooperation develops successfully, regardless of old traumas and resentments. There are some 
highly visible extra-governmental organisations, such as the All-Polish Lithuania Lovers Club, 
the "Borderland" Foundation, cultural associations, as well as working contacts between the 
parliaments of the two countries. There is a considerable Polish minority in Lithuania and a 
smaller Lithuanian minority in Poland, both of which have their own schools and institutions 
and enjoy full rights. Poland supports Lithuania's efforts to secure admission to NATO and the 
EU. However, problems of various calibre keep cropping up at the local level. Polish observers 
sometimes get the impression that there must be forces in Lithuania that are interested in 
continued friction in bilateral relations. Vytautas Landsbergis, the speaker of Lithuania's 
Seimas (parliament) and first president of the reborn Lithuanian state, advised "caution in 
assessing some aspects of bilateral relations" and drew attention to the presence of numerous 
publications printed outside the two countries which could adversely affect the good relations. 
  There are plenty of examples proving that there is a lot or irritability in relations 
between CEE countries. It could be concluded that political liberalisation unburied old 
subcutaneous conflicts and recriminations going back to the years of World War II, the times 
when the Yalta order was being imposed, or the communist era. After fifty years, blank pages 
in history books were filled for the first time and attempts to make amends were launched. 
These are on the whole very painful endeavours, which effectively divide the societies once 
again. Some people want to purge history of lies, others would rather drop a veil of silence 
around it. The few examples given above indicate the extent of emotions aroused by the past 
and the diversity of dividing lines in the societies of CEE countries. 
  The bilateral relations between the individual countries are additionally affected by 
their histories ties to Russia. On this basis it has been suggested that Moscow holds the key to 
many European challenges related to the functioning of the eastern border, and that regardless 
of whether a given state borders on Russia or not. In the case of some countries, this is due to 
the fact that they had coexisted with the Russians within the Tsarist empire or the Soviet 
Union, with its centralised economic and political system, while for others it was their membership of the so-called socialist camp, which was formed as a result of the Yalta 
Conference and in practice signified political, economic and military subordination to the 
USSR. The attitude to those historic developments, including economic ones, also continues to 
influence the Russians themselves, who find it hard to reappraise their past. There is a sizeable 
Russian community in many of the new states and the Russian language is still widely used. 
This greatly facilitates direct references to Russian historic consciousness, which remains 
firmly anchored in people's minds. This is a potential source of conflicts in the new states. 
  But the Russian problem itself is more complex because the Russian public eagerly 
resorts to Great Russian tradition. On the whole, with much simplification, the Russian public 
opinion remains stuck in 19
th century big-power ambitions, which see the old Russian tradition 
of conquests as the source of greatness. At the threshold of the 21
st century, the Russian people 
view the loss of influence and of the territory of the formerly federated republics as a painful 
blow that nearly threatens their own statehood. The balance sheet of gains and losses of the 
decolonialisation, which is known to West European societies, is not accepted in Moscow. Not 
that the Russians lack this kind of bitter experience, just to mention the prolonged Afghan war 
and the first Chechnya war. However, the process of reappraisals has not begun there. The 
public is not looking for alternative solutions, it has not revised the old stereotypes. The 
Russians have not taken up a discussion over the views and standards that got accepted in the 
integrating Europe and globalising world. The lack of such standards can be seen as 
anachronistic or as a sign of fundamentalist thinking. Militant nationalism and an instrumental 
approach to ethnic stereotypes about Chechnyans, which led to the launch of a new war in 
1999, appear to bear out this diagnosis. Another evidence of the problem is the fact that the 
average educated Russian, holder of a university degree, is still unable to accept Ukraine as a 
sovereign and independent country. Meanwhile, the president of Belarus, similarly as many 
citizens of his country, feel that there is a need to maintain a union with Russia and voluntarily 
surrenders his country's independence. If this trend continues, the Polish-Belarusian border can 
become the Polish-Russian one. 
  I am referring in this paper to certain old stereotypes, the awareness of which turns out 
to be useful for analysing geopolitical factors. In the light of observations made in the region in 
question and especially contacts with people who display their disapproval and prejudices over 
Poland's accession to NATO, this appears to be an important consideration. In the former 
Soviet republics there are invariably large groups of people with a strong pro-Russian 
orientation. Paradoxically, this is a revival of the old dispute dividing influential Russian milieux into the advocates of upholding old Russian traditions and the supporters of 
Westernisation. The paradox consists in the fact that the former do not fully realise how strong 
Russia's relations with Europe are, how many elements of West European customs and culture 
are already present in modern Russia. The demonstrations of Russianity conceived in an 
extremist fashion, on the other hand, leads to isolationism, which has been rejected in 
contemporary world as rather ineffective. 
  The disintegration of the Soviet Union has revived old divisions, on which new ones 
have been superimposed. The societies of the former republics have become polarised over 
opposed orientations, i.e. those supporting moves aimed at laying the foundations of a market 
economy and parliamentary democracy and the advocates of restoring the former state of 
affairs. Both orientations are already rooted to a considerable extent in the former systems of 
government. In the societies of the new states situated along Poland's eastern border, i.e., in 
Belarus and Ukraine, these proportions varied and fluctuated. The general rule is that the 
closer one gets to the state border, the bigger the number of supporters of democratic changes 
and free market. This must have been influenced by the personal benefits to the respondents 
from the open border. On the other hand, the burdens associated with the transformations 
boosted the proportion of people advocating the restitution of the Soviet Union. Especially 
among elderly people with a low level of formal education or lower incomes the proportion of 
advocates of market reforms and liberalisation tended to be lower. The people feared the need 
of further sacrifice, of the need to look after one's future, of responsibility and the inevitable 
element of risk. Genuine fear of change in some people coupled to open resistance of others 
were responsible for the fact that neither Ukraine nor Belarus imparted enough impetus to their 
reforms. 
  The superior goal in implementing the European challenged to the functioning of the 
eastern border should be to integrate Russia with the broader Atlantic community on the basis 
of shared values and mutually respected principles of civilised behaviour. 
5. Crash Course in Market Economy for Southern Podlasie Entrepreneurs 
  The acceleration accompanying the first phase of transformations in Poland's eastern 
regions was dictated by exogenous factors generated by the short-lived political liberalisation 
and the lack of clear geopolitical criteria. The first major breakthrough was the aforementioned 
boom in cross-border trade, which could be termed international trade, considering the 
proclamation of independence by the new states. However, the Polish society was relatively 
slow to learn to distinguish between the citizens of individual states. At first they were all called Russians because they spoke the Russian language which many Poles could understand, 
sometimes confusing Belarusian or Ukrainian for Russian. Eventually, such distinctions 
became important because the individual countries had different passport, customs or foreign 
exchange regulations, different rules governing tourism, different tax systems, etc. Polish 
businessmen then had to take a crash course not only in market economy rules but also 
international relations and international law. If it is remembered that many of them lived off 
agriculture previously, the shock could hardly be greater. 
  We were then witnessing an impressive flexibility of economic undertakings 
encouraged by the market and by the opening up of the border. There were endless changes 
with regard to the products and industries specialising in delivering the goods most sought 
after in the East. The low fares then in force in the former USSR made it profitable even for 
the inhabitants of faraway Asian republics to come shopping to Poland. Many of them quickly 
turned into professional traders, who established commercial contacts anywhere from Turkey 
to India to China in search for the best offers. This was a globalisation of sorts at the level of 
quasi-merchants. Also Southern Podlasie manufacturers quickly adapted to the growing 
demands of customers from the East. Despite strong international competition, they succeeded 
in awakening new demand by offering Eastern customers goods they could not know from the 
communist era. 
  At first the travellers arriving from the East started by selling the merchandise they 
brought with themselves before going on a buying spree. However, the goods were rarely 
attractive and soon it was impossible to sell them even at very low prices on the local market. 
Then the visitors tried to travel deeper into Poland, even to very remote places. This was when 
Warsaw's biggest sports arena, the 10
th Anniversary Stadium, was turned into a bazaar, which 
it remains to this day, although its heyday is over. In the early 1990s, a typical scene on a train 
in that region were people with huge bags who only asked about the way to the stadium, as the 
rest of the city or even its name did not matter to them at all. But the growth of transportation 
costs led to a polarisation among the pseudo-tourists. Some could no longer afford to come 
while others had already made a small fortune. The appearance of the first restrictions on 
crossing the border coincided with changes in the nature of trade. Polish middlemen took over 
the purchasing of the goods brought by the visitors, who also offered a full range of services 
such as accommodation, security, help in buying merchandise to take back to the East, or 
transport services—this because driving in vehicles bearing Eastern number plates became 
risky due to the spread of extortion rackets led by the citizens of the former Soviet lands. Shortly afterwards many Eastern visitors began to come without anything to sell, just wads of 
dollar bills for spending on the purchase of merchandise. Then the goods were physically 
carried across the border by hired Poles, often without paying the customs duties due. Those 
merchants, who had bigger funds at their disposal, were not satisfied with Poland's border 
regions as they did business on a grander scale in big cities. 
  The widespread shortage of capital and business infrastructure was the reason why 
bartering predominated in international trade. Financial services, on the other hand, were left 
to Western banks. The exceptional boom and the vastness of the Eastern market led to the 
emergence of big firms, much larger than any that could be encountered in the border regions. 
Poland's eastern borderlands flourished mainly thanks to the people who established a market 
economy on a local scale and who typically just registered their first small or medium firm. At 
the same time, supply shortfalls appeared due to the region's small economic potential. 
  Over a three-year period, business associations were formed in Poland, such as the ones 
set up by the merchants from individual bazaars of Podlasie. The nascent private sector was 
generating durable forms of cooperation, with the emergence of networks of producers, 
suppliers, distributors, etc. also in the border regions. This led to the establishment of many 
firms that could afford to invest in their growth. These firms build themselves new 
headquarters, set up branches, or the firms themselves would move to a new site, often in a 
special economic zone or other areas on the eastern side of the border. One way or another, in 
Southern Podlasie business activities proceeded at various levels, catering to definite groups of 
customers, and many firms worked solely for foreign markets. 
  The first drop in the number of arrivals from the East, along with a revision of the list 
of places that appealed to them most, came with the 1
st Chechnya war of 1994. This was when 
Belarus imposed stricter border controls, with Ukraine and Rumania taking over part of the 
stream of visitors who used to come to Southern Podlasie. As a result, the region in question 
registered changes that could be traced to geopolitical factors. The drop in the number of 
visitors was reflected in a dramatic fall in sales of goods and services, empty streets and shops, 
etc. These political developments coincided with the growth of competition and increasing 
fiscality of the young states, which encouraged the establishment of manufacturing firms close 
to the markets. This was when some companies from Podlasie moved away from the region, 
while the first joint-venture companies, which benefited from tax breaks, were established. 
  The drop in the number of visitors followed from the stricter enforcement of the 
regulations concerning visas, invitations, the need to buy vouchers with which one could pay for tourist services or the requirement of having a specified amount of money in convertible 
currencies. This last named hurdle was particularly high because wages in the East stayed at a 
very low level. As a result, the number of visitors shrank and merchant organisations began to 
protest against government decisions. Then the requirements were periodically lowered. 
Similarly, changes in customs duties effectively modified the intensity of traffic at border 
crossings and influenced the interest in the development of trans-border cooperation. 
  In connection with the obligations the Polish government undertook in connection with 
the Poland's status as a EU-associated country, on January 1, 1998 the so-called sealing up of 
the eastern border took place. Direct contacts were severely curtailed in this manner, leading to 
a fresh dramatic fall in trade. Earlier, similarly restrictive regulations were also introduced by 
other countries, whether as a reciprocal measure of in order to boost Treasury revenue, as was 
the case with Ukraine and Belarus. However, entrepreneurs either managed to secure a reversal 
of the decisions or modified the operations of their firms as appropriate. In Poland, the 
"Europeanisation" of the operation of border crossings was seen by the people affected by it as 
growing impediments to the operation of small and medium firms. In Belarus, it was 
additionally exploited as an opportunity to clamp down on the parallel economy and was 
regarded as the country's official lack of consent to the operation of the private sector. 
  In Poland, these official moves were seen as unjust because they undid the hard-earned 
stability, a blow directed by the authorities at their own citizens living in border regions. This 
was a time of painstaking rebuilding of prosperity, this time in fierce competition with EU 
businesses, which ever more successfully gained control of the Eastern market. The Polish 
capital was too weak by comparison, although the Poles knew more about the East. The 
government's policies aroused a lot of controversy and protests, especially on behalf of the 
eastern regions, but those voices were not heeded in the capital. This policy was termed as the 
cooling off of the economy and it effectively slowed down the pace of economic growth in the 
eastern lands half a year before the Russian crisis came as the second blow. 
  The discussions over the rationale for cooling off an overheating economy also in the 
eastern regions have continued to this day. The fact is that the August financial crisis in 
Moscow and the devaluation of the rouble hit the eastern and poorest part of Poland the 
hardest. The disruption of growth was chiefly due to external upheavals which could not have 
been predicted. But for the inhabitants of the border regions this was tantamount to being 
deliberately denied by the central government of at least six months of prosperity. The 
advocates of the cooling off argue that thanks to the operation, the Russian crisis came as a smaller shock because it already occurred at a time of reduced growth, but it cannot be denied 
that the two factors combined lead to a 60% fall in sales to Russia, the bulk of which were 
effected through trans-border trade. 
  With the Russian crisis, the situation changed dramatically. The Russian society got 
poorer due to the devaluation of the rouble and could not afford, for example, Polish food 
products, which suddenly became luxuries. The Russian crisis adversely affected the 
economies of all the new states, leading to a drastic fall in the purchasing power of their 
population. Meanwhile, Western firms appeared on the Eastern market with their subsidised 
foodstuffs. Polish firms get no government subsidies and many of them had to quit that market 
ass a result. 
  With the exception of Lithuania, the Russian crisis demonstrated the huge dependence 
of Belarus and Ukraine on the Russian economy and the same can be said of Poland's eastern 
borderlands. The balance sheet of the 1990s for Russia includes several bouts of 
hyperinflation, devaluation, a collapse of the financial system, drop in production, the standard 
of living and growing unemployment. Even so, next to the growth of world oil prices, the 
deflation become one of the factors behind that country's economic recovery that began in 
1999. At the same time, much of the former barter has been replaced by regular trade and the 
performance of Russian enterprises improved. But the questions remain. Will the symptoms of 
economic recovery infect Russia's western neighbours, i.e. Belarus and Ukraine, and will they 
next reach Poland's eastern borderlands? Or will the growth impulses reach Poland directly? 
Or, as Poland's integration with the EU proceeds, will it rather be a case of EU firms turning 
out to be more competitive in the East, the first taste of which already came after the August 
1998 crisis? 
  In 2000, the general expectations are for a return to the fast growth rate. After the 
disappearance of the negative external determinants, which reactivated the geopolitical factors, 
economic recovery and a faster adjustment to EU standards are anticipated. However, it is still 
difficult to predict how in these changed circumstances the experience of Southern Podlasie 
entrepreneurs will be exploited for boosting trans-border cooperation at the local and the 
regional level, which translates directly into their presence on the eastern markets. 
6. Concluding remarks 
  The winners and the losers of the first phase of the transformations among the CEE 
countries are generally known. The difficulties posed by market economy have been thoroughly analysed and described. The hopes for a repetition of the scenario of similar events 
and processes witnessed earlier along Poland's western border with Germany, which also 
generated economic recovery in border areas, both on a local and regional scale, proved 
illusory. Poland's capacity to exert this kind of influence on bilateral relations along the eastern 
border turned out to be incomparably smaller than the influence exerted by reunified Germany. 
  The experience from monitoring the eastern border exploded another illusion, namely 
that early successes can promise future development and guarantee Polish firms a strong 
position on the Eastern market. The Russian crisis thwarted this kind of wishful thinking 
because geopolitical factors which exerted a definite influence on bilateral relations got 
activated on a big scale along the eastern border. It turns out that recapturing market share is a 
difficult and time-consuming process. Besides, it is much easier for bigger firms, of which 
there are but a few in the Southern Podlasie region. The selection process among enterprises 
proceeded amid fierce competition. New companies were set up, old ones changed their area 
of operation, moved to new regions or new fields of industry, etc. This process was easy to see 
in Southern Podlasie, especially among newly established small and medium firms, which 
suddenly boomed, collapsed or reorganised. Even so, the scale of changes accompanying the 
transformations was such that it was possible for many Polish entrepreneurs to find room for 
themselves. Many Polish firms were already present on the Eastern market previously and they 
successfully adapted to the changed situation.  
  It seemed that the boom would last long. The sheer volume of the Eastern market and 
the appetite for consumer goods was so huge that at first the quality of the products was not a 
major concern. Many Polish manufacturers got used to relatively low requirements of Eastern 
consumers and did not pay sufficiently much attention to the standard of their goods. This was 
a guarantee of a disaster the moment Western firms began to eye these markets. Then the 
going got tough and Polish firms, denied government subsidies, could only compete thanks to 
lower costs or the ability to match the tastes of Eastern buyers better. 
  Poland will be obliged to implement the common EU visa system; it already began to 
prepare for it in 1998, when stricter control of the border was introduced. In order to abide by 
the EU regulations, Poland will have to terminate the agreements with 15 former Eastern bloc 
countries on the abolition of visas. These agreements are as a rule bilateral ones, so those 
countries will reciprocate the move and reintroduce visas for Poles. In the decade now ending, 
there have been especially much of such tit-for-tat in economic relations. Still, it is necessary 
to search for the right solutions, so as to make sure that the introduction of European visas conforming to EU regulations does not become a repetition of the sad experience of Polish 
entrepreneurs from the time of sealing the border or of cooling off the economy. We should 
strive to make the eastern border as open and friendly to all those engaging in honest trade and 
developing goodneighbourly relations as the Polish-German border is now. Then the future 
external border of the EU will not keep alive old resentments and prejudice or generate 
negative effects of geopolitical dimensions. 
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